How to stop future viruses.

[Brandon S. Allbery]

As quoted from <556 at suadb.UUCP> by anders at suadb.UUCP (Anders Bj|rnerstedt):
+---------------
| 6. A less blunt use of the set-user-id mechanism.
|    Sendmail apparently needs to do rights amplification,
|    but I dont see why it needs superuser rights. The uucp
+---------------

On networked systems, sendmail has to be able to listen on the SMTP network
port -- which requires superuser permissions.

+---------------
| 7. It should be *possible* to physically write lock filesystems
|    including the root file system. The disk write lock could
+---------------

SunOS 4.x mounts / read-only, doesn't it?

+---------------
|    systems marked "secure". The kernel (which would itself be
|    placed in a secure filesystem) would only allow writes to
|    a secure filesystem if a physical togle was in the "open"
|    position. Normally the togle would be in the closed position.
+---------------

Interesting thought.  However, I think it should be reserved for heavy-duty
security; such an arrangement, for example, would mean the end of ncoast.
(Most of the maintenance on ncoast is done over the modem.)

++Brandon
-- 
Brandon S. Allbery, comp.sources.misc moderator and one admin of ncoast PA UN*X
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