NetBSD-5.0.2/crypto/dist/ssh/auth.c
/* $NetBSD: auth.c,v 1.27 2008/04/06 23:38:19 christos Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.78 2007/09/21 08:15:29 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
__RCSID("$NetBSD: auth.c,v 1.27 2008/04/06 23:38:19 christos Exp $");
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <libgen.h>
#include <login_cap.h>
#include <paths.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "groupaccess.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "packet.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
#include <login_cap.h>
#endif
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern int use_privsep;
/* Debugging messages */
Buffer auth_debug;
int auth_debug_init;
/*
* Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
* in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
* will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
* there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
* listed there, false will be returned.
* If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
* Otherwise true is returned.
*/
int
allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
{
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
extern login_cap_t *lc;
int match_name, match_ip;
char *cap_hlist, *hp;
#endif
struct stat st;
const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL;
char *shell;
u_int i;
/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
return 0;
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
hostname = get_canonical_hostname(1);
ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class);
/*
* Check the deny list.
*/
cap_hlist = login_getcapstr(lc, "host.deny", NULL, NULL);
if (cap_hlist != NULL) {
hp = strtok(cap_hlist, ",");
while (hp != NULL) {
match_name = match_hostname(hostname,
hp, strlen(hp));
match_ip = match_hostname(ipaddr,
hp, strlen(hp));
/*
* Only a positive match here causes a "deny".
*/
if (match_name > 0 || match_ip > 0) {
free(cap_hlist);
login_close(lc);
return 0;
}
hp = strtok(NULL, ",");
}
free(cap_hlist);
}
/*
* Check the allow list. If the allow list exists, and the
* remote host is not in it, the user is implicitly denied.
*/
cap_hlist = login_getcapstr(lc, "host.allow", NULL, NULL);
if (cap_hlist != NULL) {
hp = strtok(cap_hlist, ",");
if (hp == NULL) {
/* Just in case there's an empty string... */
free(cap_hlist);
login_close(lc);
return 0;
}
while (hp != NULL) {
match_name = match_hostname(hostname,
hp, strlen(hp));
match_ip = match_hostname(ipaddr,
hp, strlen(hp));
/*
* Negative match causes an immediate "deny".
* Positive match causes us to break out
* of the loop (allowing a fallthrough).
*/
if (match_name < 0 || match_ip < 0) {
free(cap_hlist);
login_close(lc);
return 0;
}
if (match_name > 0 || match_ip > 0)
break;
hp = strtok(NULL, ",");
}
free(cap_hlist);
if (hp == NULL) {
login_close(lc);
return 0;
}
}
login_close(lc);
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (!options.use_pam) {
#endif
/*
* password/account expiration.
*/
if (pw->pw_change || pw->pw_expire) {
struct timeval tv;
(void)gettimeofday(&tv, (struct timezone *)NULL);
if (pw->pw_expire) {
if (tv.tv_sec >= pw->pw_expire) {
logit("User %.100s not allowed because account has expired",
pw->pw_name);
return 0; /* expired */
}
}
#ifdef _PASSWORD_CHGNOW
if (pw->pw_change == _PASSWORD_CHGNOW) {
logit("User %.100s not allowed because password needs to be changed",
pw->pw_name);
return 0; /* can't force password change (yet) */
}
#endif
if (pw->pw_change) {
if (tv.tv_sec >= pw->pw_change) {
logit("User %.100s not allowed because password has expired",
pw->pw_name);
return 0; /* expired */
}
}
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
}
#endif
/*
* Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is
* legal, and means /bin/sh.
*/
shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
/* deny if shell does not exists or is not executable */
/*
* XXX Should check to see if it is executable by the
* XXX requesting user. --thorpej
*/
if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s does not exist",
pw->pw_name, shell);
return 0;
}
if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
(st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s is not executable",
pw->pw_name, shell);
return 0;
}
/*
* XXX Consider nuking {Allow,Deny}{Users,Groups}. We have the
* XXX login_cap(3) mechanism which covers all other types of
* XXX logins, too.
*/
if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
}
/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
options.deny_users[i])) {
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
"because listed in DenyUsers",
pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
}
/* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
options.allow_users[i]))
break;
/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
"not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
}
if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
/* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
"not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
/* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
options.num_deny_groups)) {
ga_free();
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
"because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
/*
* Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
* isn't listed there
*/
if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
options.num_allow_groups)) {
ga_free();
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
"because none of user's groups are listed "
"in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
ga_free();
}
/* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
return 1;
}
void
auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
{
void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
char *authmsg;
if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
return;
/* Raise logging level */
if (authenticated == 1 ||
!authctxt->valid ||
authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
authlog = logit;
if (authctxt->postponed)
authmsg = "Postponed";
else
authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
authmsg,
method,
authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
authctxt->user,
get_remote_ipaddr(),
get_remote_port(),
info);
}
/*
* Check whether root logins are disallowed.
*/
int
auth_root_allowed(char *method)
{
switch (options.permit_root_login) {
case PERMIT_YES:
return 1;
case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
return 1;
break;
case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
if (forced_command) {
logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
return 1;
}
break;
}
logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
return 0;
}
/*
* Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
* by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
* %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
*
* This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
*/
static char *
expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
{
char *file, ret[MAXPATHLEN];
int i;
file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
"u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
/*
* Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
* compatible and prepend the '%h/'
*/
if (*file == '/')
return (file);
i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
xfree(file);
return (xstrdup(ret));
}
char *
authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *pw)
{
return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file, pw);
}
char *
authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *pw)
{
return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw);
}
/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
HostStatus
check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
{
Key *found;
char *user_hostfile;
struct stat st;
HostStatus host_status;
/* Check if we know the host and its host key. */
found = key_new(key->type);
host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(sysfile, host, key, found, NULL);
if (host_status != HOST_OK && userfile != NULL) {
user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
if (options.strict_modes &&
(stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
(st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
"bad owner or modes for %.200s",
pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
} else {
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(user_hostfile,
host, key, found, NULL);
restore_uid();
}
xfree(user_hostfile);
}
key_free(found);
debug2("check_key_in_hostfiles: key %s for %s", host_status == HOST_OK ?
"ok" : "not found", host);
return host_status;
}
/*
* Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components
* of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
* of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
*
* XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
*
* Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and
* error buffer plus max size as arguments.
*
* Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
*/
int
secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
char *err, size_t errlen)
{
uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
char *cp;
int comparehome = 0;
struct stat st;
if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file,
strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
comparehome = 1;
/* check the open file to avoid races */
if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
(st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
(st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
buf);
return -1;
}
/* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
for (;;) {
if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
return -1;
}
strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
debug3("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
(st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
(st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
snprintf(err, errlen,
"bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
return -1;
}
/* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
buf);
break;
}
/*
* dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
* but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
*/
if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
break;
}
return 0;
}
struct passwd *
getpwnamallow(const char *user)
{
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
extern login_cap_t *lc;
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
auth_session_t *as;
#endif
#endif
struct passwd *pw;
parse_server_match_config(&options, user,
get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), get_remote_ipaddr());
pw = getpwnam(user);
if (pw == NULL) {
logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",
user, get_remote_ipaddr());
return (NULL);
}
if (!allowed_user(pw))
return (NULL);
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
return (NULL);
}
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
pw = NULL;
}
if (as != NULL)
auth_close(as);
#endif
#endif
if (pw != NULL)
return (pwcopy(pw));
return (NULL);
}
void
auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
{
char buf[1024];
va_list args;
if (!auth_debug_init)
return;
va_start(args, fmt);
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf);
}
void
auth_debug_send(void)
{
char *msg;
if (!auth_debug_init)
return;
while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL);
packet_send_debug("%s", msg);
xfree(msg);
}
}
void
auth_debug_reset(void)
{
if (auth_debug_init)
buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
else {
buffer_init(&auth_debug);
auth_debug_init = 1;
}
}
struct passwd *
fakepw(void)
{
static struct passwd fake;
memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
fake.pw_passwd =
"$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK";
fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
fake.pw_uid = (uid_t)-1;
fake.pw_gid = (gid_t)-1;
fake.pw_class = "";
fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
return (&fake);
}