NetBSD-5.0.2/sys/kern/kern_prot.c
/* $NetBSD: kern_prot.c,v 1.108 2008/10/11 13:40:57 pooka Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
* (c) UNIX System Laboratories, Inc.
* All or some portions of this file are derived from material licensed
* to the University of California by American Telephone and Telegraph
* Co. or Unix System Laboratories, Inc. and are reproduced herein with
* the permission of UNIX System Laboratories, Inc.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* @(#)kern_prot.c 8.9 (Berkeley) 2/14/95
*/
/*
* System calls related to processes and protection
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: kern_prot.c,v 1.108 2008/10/11 13:40:57 pooka Exp $");
#include "opt_compat_43.h"
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/acct.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/ucred.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/timeb.h>
#include <sys/times.h>
#include <sys/pool.h>
#include <sys/prot.h>
#include <sys/syslog.h>
#include <sys/uidinfo.h>
#include <sys/kauth.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/syscallargs.h>
int sys_getpid(struct lwp *, const void *, register_t *);
int sys_getpid_with_ppid(struct lwp *, const void *, register_t *);
int sys_getuid(struct lwp *, const void *, register_t *);
int sys_getuid_with_euid(struct lwp *, const void *, register_t *);
int sys_getgid(struct lwp *, const void *, register_t *);
int sys_getgid_with_egid(struct lwp *, const void *, register_t *);
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_getpid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
{
struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
*retval = p->p_pid;
return (0);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_getpid_with_ppid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
{
struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
retval[0] = p->p_pid;
retval[1] = p->p_ppid;
return (0);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_getppid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
{
struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
*retval = p->p_ppid;
return (0);
}
/* Get process group ID; note that POSIX getpgrp takes no parameter */
int
sys_getpgrp(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
{
struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
mutex_enter(proc_lock);
*retval = p->p_pgrp->pg_id;
mutex_exit(proc_lock);
return (0);
}
/*
* Return the process group ID of the session leader (session ID)
* for the specified process.
*/
int
sys_getsid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_getsid_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscalldarg(pid_t) pid;
} */
pid_t pid = SCARG(uap, pid);
struct proc *p;
int error = 0;
mutex_enter(proc_lock);
if (pid == 0)
*retval = l->l_proc->p_session->s_sid;
else if ((p = p_find(pid, PFIND_LOCKED)) != NULL)
*retval = p->p_session->s_sid;
else
error = ESRCH;
mutex_exit(proc_lock);
return error;
}
int
sys_getpgid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_getpgid_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(pid_t) pid;
} */
pid_t pid = SCARG(uap, pid);
struct proc *p;
int error = 0;
mutex_enter(proc_lock);
if (pid == 0)
*retval = l->l_proc->p_pgid;
else if ((p = p_find(pid, PFIND_LOCKED)) != NULL)
*retval = p->p_pgid;
else
error = ESRCH;
mutex_exit(proc_lock);
return error;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_getuid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
{
*retval = kauth_cred_getuid(l->l_cred);
return (0);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_getuid_with_euid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
{
retval[0] = kauth_cred_getuid(l->l_cred);
retval[1] = kauth_cred_geteuid(l->l_cred);
return (0);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_geteuid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
{
*retval = kauth_cred_geteuid(l->l_cred);
return (0);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_getgid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
{
*retval = kauth_cred_getgid(l->l_cred);
return (0);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_getgid_with_egid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
{
retval[0] = kauth_cred_getgid(l->l_cred);
retval[1] = kauth_cred_getegid(l->l_cred);
return (0);
}
/*
* Get effective group ID. The "egid" is groups[0], and could be obtained
* via getgroups. This syscall exists because it is somewhat painful to do
* correctly in a library function.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_getegid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
{
*retval = kauth_cred_getegid(l->l_cred);
return (0);
}
int
sys_getgroups(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_getgroups_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) gidsetsize;
syscallarg(gid_t *) gidset;
} */
*retval = kauth_cred_ngroups(l->l_cred);
if (SCARG(uap, gidsetsize) == 0)
return 0;
if (SCARG(uap, gidsetsize) < *retval)
return EINVAL;
return kauth_cred_getgroups(l->l_cred, SCARG(uap, gidset), *retval,
UIO_USERSPACE);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_setsid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
{
struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
int error;
error = enterpgrp(p, p->p_pid, p->p_pid, 1);
*retval = p->p_pid;
return (error);
}
/*
* set process group (setpgid/old setpgrp)
*
* caller does setpgid(targpid, targpgid)
*
* pgid must be in valid range (EINVAL)
* pid must be caller or child of caller (ESRCH)
* if a child
* pid must be in same session (EPERM)
* pid can't have done an exec (EACCES)
* if pgid != pid
* there must exist some pid in same session having pgid (EPERM)
* pid must not be session leader (EPERM)
*
* Permission checks now in enterpgrp()
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_setpgid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_setpgid_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) pid;
syscallarg(int) pgid;
} */
struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
pid_t targp, pgid;
if (SCARG(uap, pgid) < 0)
return EINVAL;
if ((targp = SCARG(uap, pid)) == 0)
targp = p->p_pid;
if ((pgid = SCARG(uap, pgid)) == 0)
pgid = targp;
return enterpgrp(p, targp, pgid, 0);
}
/*
* Set real, effective and saved uids to the requested values.
* non-root callers can only ever change uids to values that match
* one of the processes current uid values.
* This is further restricted by the flags argument.
*/
int
do_setresuid(struct lwp *l, uid_t r, uid_t e, uid_t sv, u_int flags)
{
struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
kauth_cred_t cred, ncred;
ncred = kauth_cred_alloc();
/* Get a write lock on the process credential. */
proc_crmod_enter();
cred = p->p_cred;
/*
* Check that the new value is one of the allowed existing values,
* or that we have root privilege.
*/
if ((r != -1
&& !((flags & ID_R_EQ_R) && r == kauth_cred_getuid(cred))
&& !((flags & ID_R_EQ_E) && r == kauth_cred_geteuid(cred))
&& !((flags & ID_R_EQ_S) && r == kauth_cred_getsvuid(cred))) ||
(e != -1
&& !((flags & ID_E_EQ_R) && e == kauth_cred_getuid(cred))
&& !((flags & ID_E_EQ_E) && e == kauth_cred_geteuid(cred))
&& !((flags & ID_E_EQ_S) && e == kauth_cred_getsvuid(cred))) ||
(sv != -1
&& !((flags & ID_S_EQ_R) && sv == kauth_cred_getuid(cred))
&& !((flags & ID_S_EQ_E) && sv == kauth_cred_geteuid(cred))
&& !((flags & ID_S_EQ_S) && sv == kauth_cred_getsvuid(cred)))) {
int error;
error = kauth_authorize_process(cred, KAUTH_PROCESS_SETID,
p, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (error != 0) {
proc_crmod_leave(cred, ncred, false);
return error;
}
}
/* If nothing has changed, short circuit the request */
if ((r == -1 || r == kauth_cred_getuid(cred))
&& (e == -1 || e == kauth_cred_geteuid(cred))
&& (sv == -1 || sv == kauth_cred_getsvuid(cred))) {
proc_crmod_leave(cred, ncred, false);
return 0;
}
kauth_cred_clone(cred, ncred);
if (r != -1 && r != kauth_cred_getuid(ncred)) {
/* Update count of processes for this user */
(void)chgproccnt(kauth_cred_getuid(ncred), -1);
(void)chgproccnt(r, 1);
kauth_cred_setuid(ncred, r);
}
if (sv != -1)
kauth_cred_setsvuid(ncred, sv);
if (e != -1)
kauth_cred_seteuid(ncred, e);
/* Broadcast our credentials to the process and other LWPs. */
proc_crmod_leave(ncred, cred, true);
return 0;
}
/*
* Set real, effective and saved gids to the requested values.
* non-root callers can only ever change gids to values that match
* one of the processes current gid values.
* This is further restricted by the flags argument.
*/
int
do_setresgid(struct lwp *l, gid_t r, gid_t e, gid_t sv, u_int flags)
{
struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
kauth_cred_t cred, ncred;
ncred = kauth_cred_alloc();
/* Get a write lock on the process credential. */
proc_crmod_enter();
cred = p->p_cred;
/*
* check new value is one of the allowed existing values.
* otherwise, check if we have root privilege.
*/
if ((r != -1
&& !((flags & ID_R_EQ_R) && r == kauth_cred_getgid(cred))
&& !((flags & ID_R_EQ_E) && r == kauth_cred_getegid(cred))
&& !((flags & ID_R_EQ_S) && r == kauth_cred_getsvgid(cred))) ||
(e != -1
&& !((flags & ID_E_EQ_R) && e == kauth_cred_getgid(cred))
&& !((flags & ID_E_EQ_E) && e == kauth_cred_getegid(cred))
&& !((flags & ID_E_EQ_S) && e == kauth_cred_getsvgid(cred))) ||
(sv != -1
&& !((flags & ID_S_EQ_R) && sv == kauth_cred_getgid(cred))
&& !((flags & ID_S_EQ_E) && sv == kauth_cred_getegid(cred))
&& !((flags & ID_S_EQ_S) && sv == kauth_cred_getsvgid(cred)))) {
int error;
error = kauth_authorize_process(cred, KAUTH_PROCESS_SETID,
p, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (error != 0) {
proc_crmod_leave(cred, ncred, false);
return error;
}
}
/* If nothing has changed, short circuit the request */
if ((r == -1 || r == kauth_cred_getgid(cred))
&& (e == -1 || e == kauth_cred_getegid(cred))
&& (sv == -1 || sv == kauth_cred_getsvgid(cred))) {
proc_crmod_leave(cred, ncred, false);
return 0;
}
kauth_cred_clone(cred, ncred);
if (r != -1)
kauth_cred_setgid(ncred, r);
if (sv != -1)
kauth_cred_setsvgid(ncred, sv);
if (e != -1)
kauth_cred_setegid(ncred, e);
/* Broadcast our credentials to the process and other LWPs. */
proc_crmod_leave(ncred, cred, true);
return 0;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_setuid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_setuid_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(uid_t) uid;
} */
uid_t uid = SCARG(uap, uid);
return do_setresuid(l, uid, uid, uid,
ID_R_EQ_R | ID_E_EQ_R | ID_S_EQ_R);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_seteuid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_seteuid_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(uid_t) euid;
} */
return do_setresuid(l, -1, SCARG(uap, euid), -1, ID_E_EQ_R | ID_E_EQ_S);
}
int
sys_setreuid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_setreuid_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(uid_t) ruid;
syscallarg(uid_t) euid;
} */
kauth_cred_t cred = l->l_cred;
uid_t ruid, euid, svuid;
ruid = SCARG(uap, ruid);
euid = SCARG(uap, euid);
if (ruid == -1)
ruid = kauth_cred_getuid(cred);
if (euid == -1)
euid = kauth_cred_geteuid(cred);
/* Saved uid is set to the new euid if the ruid changed */
svuid = (ruid == kauth_cred_getuid(cred)) ? -1 : euid;
return do_setresuid(l, ruid, euid, svuid,
ID_R_EQ_R | ID_R_EQ_E |
ID_E_EQ_R | ID_E_EQ_E | ID_E_EQ_S |
ID_S_EQ_R | ID_S_EQ_E | ID_S_EQ_S);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_setgid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_setgid_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(gid_t) gid;
} */
gid_t gid = SCARG(uap, gid);
return do_setresgid(l, gid, gid, gid,
ID_R_EQ_R | ID_E_EQ_R | ID_S_EQ_R);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_setegid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_setegid_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(gid_t) egid;
} */
return do_setresgid(l, -1, SCARG(uap, egid), -1, ID_E_EQ_R | ID_E_EQ_S);
}
int
sys_setregid(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_setregid_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(gid_t) rgid;
syscallarg(gid_t) egid;
} */
kauth_cred_t cred = l->l_cred;
gid_t rgid, egid, svgid;
rgid = SCARG(uap, rgid);
egid = SCARG(uap, egid);
if (rgid == -1)
rgid = kauth_cred_getgid(cred);
if (egid == -1)
egid = kauth_cred_getegid(cred);
/* Saved gid is set to the new egid if the rgid changed */
svgid = rgid == kauth_cred_getgid(cred) ? -1 : egid;
return do_setresgid(l, rgid, egid, svgid,
ID_R_EQ_R | ID_R_EQ_E |
ID_E_EQ_R | ID_E_EQ_E | ID_E_EQ_S |
ID_S_EQ_R | ID_S_EQ_E | ID_S_EQ_S);
}
int
sys_issetugid(struct lwp *l, const void *v, register_t *retval)
{
struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
/*
* Note: OpenBSD sets a P_SUGIDEXEC flag set at execve() time,
* we use PK_SUGID because we consider changing the owners as
* "tainting" as well.
* This is significant for procs that start as root and "become"
* a user without an exec - programs cannot know *everything*
* that libc *might* have put in their data segment.
*/
*retval = (p->p_flag & PK_SUGID) != 0;
return (0);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys_setgroups(struct lwp *l, const struct sys_setgroups_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(int) gidsetsize;
syscallarg(const gid_t *) gidset;
} */
kauth_cred_t ncred;
int error;
ncred = kauth_cred_alloc();
error = kauth_cred_setgroups(ncred, SCARG(uap, gidset),
SCARG(uap, gidsetsize), -1, UIO_USERSPACE);
if (error != 0) {
kauth_cred_free(ncred);
return error;
}
return kauth_proc_setgroups(l, ncred);
}
/*
* Get login name, if available.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys___getlogin(struct lwp *l, const struct sys___getlogin_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(char *) namebuf;
syscallarg(size_t) namelen;
} */
struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
char login[sizeof(p->p_session->s_login)];
int namelen = SCARG(uap, namelen);
if (namelen > sizeof(login))
namelen = sizeof(login);
mutex_enter(proc_lock);
memcpy(login, p->p_session->s_login, namelen);
mutex_exit(proc_lock);
return (copyout(login, (void *)SCARG(uap, namebuf), namelen));
}
/*
* Set login name.
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
int
sys___setlogin(struct lwp *l, const struct sys___setlogin_args *uap, register_t *retval)
{
/* {
syscallarg(const char *) namebuf;
} */
struct proc *p = l->l_proc;
struct session *sp;
char newname[sizeof sp->s_login + 1];
int error;
if ((error = kauth_authorize_process(l->l_cred, KAUTH_PROCESS_SETID,
p, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0)
return (error);
error = copyinstr(SCARG(uap, namebuf), &newname, sizeof newname, NULL);
if (error != 0)
return (error == ENAMETOOLONG ? EINVAL : error);
mutex_enter(proc_lock);
sp = p->p_session;
if (sp->s_flags & S_LOGIN_SET && p->p_pid != sp->s_sid &&
strncmp(newname, sp->s_login, sizeof sp->s_login) != 0)
log(LOG_WARNING, "%s (pid %d) changing logname from "
"%.*s to %s\n", p->p_comm, p->p_pid,
(int)sizeof sp->s_login, sp->s_login, newname);
sp->s_flags |= S_LOGIN_SET;
strncpy(sp->s_login, newname, sizeof sp->s_login);
mutex_exit(proc_lock);
return (0);
}