OpenBSD-4.6/share/man/man4/systrace.4
.\" $OpenBSD: systrace.4,v 1.17 2007/05/31 19:19:52 jmc Exp $
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.Dd $Mdocdate: May 31 2007 $
.Dt SYSTRACE 4
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm systrace
.Nd enforce and generate policies for system calls
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Cd "pseudo-device systrace" Op Ar count
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
attaches to processes and enforces policies for system calls.
A pseudo-device,
.Pa /dev/systrace ,
allows userland processes to control the behavior of
.Nm
through an
.Xr ioctl 2
interface.
.Sh SYSTEM CALL POLICIES
.Nm
can assign the following policies to system calls:
.Bl -tag -width SYSTR_POLICY_XXXXXX
.It Dv SYSTR_POLICY_ASK
Send a message of the type
.Dv SYSTR_MSG_ASK ,
and put the process to sleep until a
.Dv STRIOCANSWER
.Xr ioctl 2
is made.
.It Dv SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT
Immediately allow the system call.
.It Dv SYSTR_POLICY_NEVER
Immediately return an error code.
.El
.Sh SYSTRACE MESSAGES
A
.Xr read 2
operation on the
.Nm
pseudo-device will block if there are no pending messages, or
return the following structure:
.Bd -literal
struct str_message {
int msg_type;
#define SYSTR_MSG_ASK 1
#define SYSTR_MSG_RES 2
#define SYSTR_MSG_EMUL 3
#define SYSTR_MSG_CHILD 4
#define SYSTR_MSG_UGID 5
#define SYSTR_MSG_POLICYFREE 6
#define SYSTR_MSG_EXECVE 7
pid_t msg_pid;
u_int16_t msg_seqnr; /* answer has to match seqnr */
short msg_policy;
union {
struct str_msg_emul msg_emul;
struct str_msg_ugid msg_ugid;
struct str_msg_ask msg_ask;
struct str_msg_child msg_child;
struct str_msg_execve msg_execve;
} msg_data;
};
struct str_msg_emul {
char emul[SYSTR_EMULEN];
};
struct str_msg_ugid {
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
};
struct str_msg_execve {
char path[MAXPATHLEN];
};
struct str_msg_ask {
int code;
int argsize;
register_t args[SYSTR_MAXARGS];
register_t rval[2];
int result;
};
struct str_msg_child {
pid_t new_pid; /* -1 if child exited */
};
.Ed
.Pp
These messages are all sent to the userland control process.
.Bl -tag -width SYSTR_MSG_XXXXXXXXXX
.It SYSTR_MSG_ASK
This message is sent whenever the kernel does not have a cached
simple policy for system call number
.Va code
within the currently set emulation.
.It SYSTR_MSG_RES
This message is sent whenever a system call is flagged with
SYSTR_FLAGS_RESULT.
.It SYSTR_MSG_EMUL
This message is sent whenever the emulation of a process changes.
.It SYSTR_MSG_CHILD
This message is sent whenever a process gains or loses a child.
In the latter case, the event is raised when the child exits, but
not when it is reaped.
.It SYSTR_MSG_UGID
This message is sent whenever the effective UID or GID has changed
during the execution of a system call.
.It SYSTR_MSG_POLICYFREE
This is sent whenever the kernel frees the policy identified by
.Va msg_policy .
.It SYSTR_MSG_EXECVE
This message is sent whenever, before a call to
.Xr execve 2
a process is privileged (technically, the process has the P_SUGID or
P_SUGIDEXEC flag set),
but after the call these privileges have been dropped.
The new image name is specified in the
.Va path
argument.
.El
.Sh IOCTL INTERFACE
.Nm
supports the following
.Xr ioctl 2
commands:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Dv STRIOCCLONE Fa "int *"
Return a
.Nm
file descriptor for
further
.Xr ioctl 2
operations.
.It Dv STRIOCATTACH Fa "pid_t *"
Attach to a process, unless:
.Bl -enum -compact -width 2n
.It
It's the process that's doing the attaching.
.It
It's a system process.
.It
It's being traced already.
.It
You do not own the process and you're not root.
.It
It's
.Xr init 8 ,
and the
kernel was not compiled with
.Cd option INSECURE .
.El
.It Dv STRIOCDETACH Fa "pid_t *"
Wake up a process if it is waiting for an answer, and detach from it.
.It Dv STRIOCANSWER Fa "struct systrace_answer *"
Tell
.Nm
what to do with a system call that was assigned a policy of
.Dv SYSTR_POLICY_ASK .
.Bd -literal
struct systrace_answer {
pid_t stra_pid; /* PID of process being traced */
u_int16_t stra_seqnr;
short reserved;
uid_t stra_seteuid; /* Elevated privileges for syscall */
uid_t stra_setegid;
int stra_policy; /* Policy to assign */
int stra_error; /* Return value of denied syscall
(will return EPERM if zero) */
int stra_flags;
#define SYSTR_FLAGS_RESULT 0x001 /* Report syscall result */
#define SYSTR_FLAGS_SETEUID 0x002
#define SYSTR_FLAGS_SETEGID 0x004
};
.Ed
.It Dv STRIOCREPORT Fa "pid_t *"
Report the current emulation a process is using inside the
.Vt msg_emul
structure.
.It Dv STRIOCREPLACE Fa "struct systrace_replace *"
Arrange for system call arguments to be replaced by arguments
supplied by the monitoring process.
.Bd -literal
struct systrace_replace {
pid_t strr_pid;
u_int16_t strr_seqnr;
int16_t reserved;
int strr_nrepl; /* # of arguments to replace */
caddr_t strr_base; /* Base user memory */
size_t strr_len; /* Length of memory */
int strr_argind[SYSTR_MAXARGS]; /* Argument indexes */
size_t strr_off[SYSTR_MAXARGS]; /* Argument offsets */
size_t strr_offlen[SYSTR_MAXARGS]; /* Argument sizes */
int32_t strr_flags[SYSTR_MAXARGS];
};
.Ed
.It Dv STRIOCIO Fa "struct systrace_io *"
Copy data in/out of the process being traced.
.Bd -literal
struct systrace_io {
pid_t strio_pid; /* PID of process being traced */
int strio_op;
#define SYSTR_READ 1
#define SYSTR_WRITE 2
void *strio_offs;
void *strio_addr;
size_t strio_len;
};
.Ed
.It Dv STRIOCPOLICY Fa "struct systrace_policy *"
Manipulate the set of policies.
.Bd -literal
struct systrace_policy {
int strp_op;
#define SYSTR_POLICY_NEW 1 /* Allocate a new policy */
#define SYSTR_POLICY_ASSIGN 2 /* Assign policy to process */
#define SYSTR_POLICY_MODIFY 3 /* Modify an entry */
int strp_num;
union {
struct {
short code;
#define SYSTR_POLICY_ASK 0
#define SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT 1
#define SYSTR_POLICY_NEVER 2
short policy;
} assign;
pid_t pid;
int maxents;
} strp_data;
#define strp_pid strp_data.pid
#define strp_maxents strp_data.maxents
#define strp_code strp_data.assign.code
#define strp_policy strp_data.assign.policy
};
.Ed
.Pp
The
.Dv SYSTR_POLICY_NEW
operation allocates a new policy of
.Va strp_maxents
entries with each initialized to
.Dv SYSTR_POLICY_ASK ,
and returns the new policy number into
.Va strp_num .
.Pp
The
.Dv SYSTR_POLICY_ASSIGN
operation attaches the policy identified by
.Va strp_num
to
.Va strp_pid ,
with a maximum of
.Va strp_maxents
entries.
.Pp
The
.Dv SYSTR_POLICY_MODIFY
operation changes the entry indexed by
.Va strp_code
to
.Va strp_policy .
.It Dv STRIOCGETCWD Fa "pid_t *"
Set the working directory of the current process to that of the
named process.
.It Dv STRIOCRESCWD
Restore the working directory of the current process.
.It Dv STRIOCINJECT
Inject a buffer into the stackgap of the traced process.
This accommodates for the manipulation of non-scalar arguments.
The actual replacement is not done until system call time,
and its presence in the stackgap is only guaranteed
for the duration of that system call.
.Bd -literal
struct systrace_inject {
/* On return, this contains the stackgap address. */
caddr_t stri_addr;
size_t stri_len;
pid_t stri_pid;
};
.Ed
.It Dv STRIOCSCRIPTNAME Fa "struct systrace_scriptname *"
Set the path of executed scripts to
.Va sn_scriptname .
.Bd -literal
struct systrace_scriptname {
pid_t sn_pid;
char sn_scriptname[MAXPATHLEN];
};
.Ed
.El
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width "/dev/systrace" -compact
.It Pa /dev/systrace
system call tracing facility
.El
.Sh EXAMPLES
The following is an example program that traces another process,
printing out the path to any
.Xr open 2
system calls it performs.
.Bd -literal
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <dev/systrace.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
/*
* Number of system calls that will be covered in our policy.
*/
#define NSYSCALLS 512
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct systrace_policy strpol;
struct systrace_answer strans;
struct systrace_io strio;
struct str_message strmsg;
int fd, cfd, pid, i;
ssize_t n;
void *p;
char c;
if ((fd = open("/dev/systrace", O_RDONLY)) == -1)
err(1, "/dev/systrace");
/*
* Get a systrace descriptor.
*/
if (ioctl(fd, STRIOCCLONE, &cfd) == -1)
err(1, "STRIOCCLONE");
close(fd);
/* Gather the PID of a process to systrace from somewhere. */
/* ... */
if (ioctl(cfd, STRIOCATTACH, &pid) == -1)
err(1, "STRIOCATTACH");
/* Install one policy. */
strpol.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_NEW;
strpol.strp_maxents = NSYSCALLS;
if (ioctl(cfd, STRIOCPOLICY, &strpol) == -1)
err(1, "STRIOCPOLICY NEW");
strpol.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_ASSIGN;
strpol.strp_pid = pid;
if (ioctl(cfd, STRIOCPOLICY, &strpol) == -1)
err(1, "STRIOCPOLICY ASSIGN");
/* Permit all system calls. */
for (i = 0; i < NSYSCALLS; i++) {
strpol.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_MODIFY;
strpol.strp_code = i;
strpol.strp_policy = SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT;
if (ioctl(cfd, STRIOCPOLICY, &strpol) == -1)
err(1, "STRIOCPOLICY MODIFY");
}
/* Ask us about open(2) system calls. */
strpol.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_MODIFY;
strpol.strp_code = 5; /* open(2) */
strpol.strp_policy = SYSTR_POLICY_ASK;
if (ioctl(cfd, STRIOCPOLICY, &strpol) == -1)
err(1, "STRIOCPOLICY MODIFY");
/*
* Now this process just answers requests for the operations the
* traced process performs that we have requested systrace to ask
* us about.
*/
while ((n = read(cfd, &strmsg, sizeof(strmsg))) ==
sizeof(strmsg)) {
switch (strmsg.msg_type) {
case SYSTR_MSG_ASK:
/* Print out the path argument to open(2). */
memcpy(&p, &strmsg.msg_data.msg_ask.args,
sizeof(p));
printf("open(");
do {
memset(&strio, 0, sizeof(strio));
strio.strio_pid = strmsg.msg_pid;
strio.strio_op = SYSTR_READ;
strio.strio_offs = p;
strio.strio_addr = &c;
strio.strio_len = 1;
if (ioctl(cfd, STRIOCIO, &strio) == -1)
err(1, "STRIOCIO");
putchar(c);
(unsigned char *)p += sizeof(char);
} while (c != '\e0');
printf(")\en");
memset(&strans, 0, sizeof(strans));
strans.stra_pid = strmsg.msg_pid;
strans.stra_seqnr = strmsg.msg_seqnr;
strans.stra_policy = SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT;
if (ioctl(cfd, STRIOCANSWER, &strans) == -1)
err(1, "STRIOCANSWER");
break;
}
}
if (n == -1)
err(1, "read");
close(cfd);
exit(0);
}
.Ed
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr systrace 1 ,
.Xr ioctl 2 ,
.Xr read 2 ,
.Xr options 4 ,
.Xr securelevel 7
.Sh HISTORY
The
.Nm
facility first appeared in
.Ox 3.2 .
.\" .Sh BUGS
.Sh CAVEATS
When creating new policies, if
.Va strp_maxents
is not large enough to accommodate any system calls needed for
fundamental process operations, the traced process will block forever.