OpenSolaris_b135/cmd/sendmail/src/tls.c
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000-2006, 2008, 2009 Sendmail, Inc. and its suppliers.
* All rights reserved.
*
* By using this file, you agree to the terms and conditions set
* forth in the LICENSE file which can be found at the top level of
* the sendmail distribution.
*
*/
#include <sendmail.h>
SM_RCSID("@(#)$Id: tls.c,v 8.114 2009/08/10 15:11:09 ca Exp $")
#if STARTTLS
# include <openssl/err.h>
# include <openssl/bio.h>
# include <openssl/pem.h>
# ifndef HASURANDOMDEV
# include <openssl/rand.h>
# endif /* ! HASURANDOMDEV */
# if !TLS_NO_RSA
static RSA *rsa_tmp = NULL; /* temporary RSA key */
static RSA *tmp_rsa_key __P((SSL *, int, int));
# endif /* !TLS_NO_RSA */
# if !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
static int tls_verify_cb __P((X509_STORE_CTX *));
# else /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */
static int tls_verify_cb __P((X509_STORE_CTX *, void *));
# endif /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */
# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L
static int x509_verify_cb __P((int, X509_STORE_CTX *));
# endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */
# if !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
# define CONST097
# else /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */
# define CONST097 const
# endif /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */
static void apps_ssl_info_cb __P((CONST097 SSL *, int , int));
static bool tls_ok_f __P((char *, char *, int));
static bool tls_safe_f __P((char *, long, bool));
static int tls_verify_log __P((int, X509_STORE_CTX *, char *));
# if !NO_DH
static DH *get_dh512 __P((void));
static unsigned char dh512_p[] =
{
0xDA,0x58,0x3C,0x16,0xD9,0x85,0x22,0x89,0xD0,0xE4,0xAF,0x75,
0x6F,0x4C,0xCA,0x92,0xDD,0x4B,0xE5,0x33,0xB8,0x04,0xFB,0x0F,
0xED,0x94,0xEF,0x9C,0x8A,0x44,0x03,0xED,0x57,0x46,0x50,0xD3,
0x69,0x99,0xDB,0x29,0xD7,0x76,0x27,0x6B,0xA2,0xD3,0xD4,0x12,
0xE2,0x18,0xF4,0xDD,0x1E,0x08,0x4C,0xF6,0xD8,0x00,0x3E,0x7C,
0x47,0x74,0xE8,0x33
};
static unsigned char dh512_g[] =
{
0x02
};
static DH *
get_dh512()
{
DH *dh = NULL;
if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
return NULL;
dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh512_p, sizeof(dh512_p), NULL);
dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh512_g, sizeof(dh512_g), NULL);
if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL))
return NULL;
return dh;
}
# endif /* !NO_DH */
/*
** TLS_RAND_INIT -- initialize STARTTLS random generator
**
** Parameters:
** randfile -- name of file with random data
** logl -- loglevel
**
** Returns:
** success/failure
**
** Side Effects:
** initializes PRNG for tls library.
*/
# define MIN_RAND_BYTES 128 /* 1024 bits */
# define RF_OK 0 /* randfile OK */
# define RF_MISS 1 /* randfile == NULL || *randfile == '\0' */
# define RF_UNKNOWN 2 /* unknown prefix for randfile */
# define RI_NONE 0 /* no init yet */
# define RI_SUCCESS 1 /* init was successful */
# define RI_FAIL 2 /* init failed */
static bool tls_rand_init __P((char *, int));
static bool
tls_rand_init(randfile, logl)
char *randfile;
int logl;
{
# ifndef HASURANDOMDEV
/* not required if /dev/urandom exists, OpenSSL does it internally */
bool ok;
int randdef;
static int done = RI_NONE;
/*
** initialize PRNG
*/
/* did we try this before? if yes: return old value */
if (done != RI_NONE)
return done == RI_SUCCESS;
/* set default values */
ok = false;
done = RI_FAIL;
randdef = (randfile == NULL || *randfile == '\0') ? RF_MISS : RF_OK;
# if EGD
if (randdef == RF_OK && sm_strncasecmp(randfile, "egd:", 4) == 0)
{
randfile += 4;
if (RAND_egd(randfile) < 0)
{
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS: RAND_egd(%s) failed: random number generator not seeded",
randfile);
}
else
ok = true;
}
else
# endif /* EGD */
if (randdef == RF_OK && sm_strncasecmp(randfile, "file:", 5) == 0)
{
int fd;
long sff;
struct stat st;
randfile += 5;
sff = SFF_SAFEDIRPATH | SFF_NOWLINK
| SFF_NOGWFILES | SFF_NOWWFILES
| SFF_NOGRFILES | SFF_NOWRFILES
| SFF_MUSTOWN | SFF_ROOTOK | SFF_OPENASROOT;
if (DontLockReadFiles)
sff |= SFF_NOLOCK;
if ((fd = safeopen(randfile, O_RDONLY, 0, sff)) >= 0)
{
if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
{
if (LogLevel > logl)
sm_syslog(LOG_ERR, NOQID,
"STARTTLS: can't fstat(%s)",
randfile);
}
else
{
bool use, problem;
use = true;
problem = false;
/* max. age of file: 10 minutes */
if (st.st_mtime + 600 < curtime())
{
use = bitnset(DBS_INSUFFICIENTENTROPY,
DontBlameSendmail);
problem = true;
if (LogLevel > logl)
sm_syslog(LOG_ERR, NOQID,
"STARTTLS: RandFile %s too old: %s",
randfile,
use ? "unsafe" :
"unusable");
}
if (use && st.st_size < MIN_RAND_BYTES)
{
use = bitnset(DBS_INSUFFICIENTENTROPY,
DontBlameSendmail);
problem = true;
if (LogLevel > logl)
sm_syslog(LOG_ERR, NOQID,
"STARTTLS: size(%s) < %d: %s",
randfile,
MIN_RAND_BYTES,
use ? "unsafe" :
"unusable");
}
if (use)
ok = RAND_load_file(randfile, -1) >=
MIN_RAND_BYTES;
if (use && !ok)
{
if (LogLevel > logl)
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS: RAND_load_file(%s) failed: random number generator not seeded",
randfile);
}
if (problem)
ok = false;
}
if (ok || bitnset(DBS_INSUFFICIENTENTROPY,
DontBlameSendmail))
{
/* add this even if fstat() failed */
RAND_seed((void *) &st, sizeof(st));
}
(void) close(fd);
}
else
{
if (LogLevel > logl)
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS: Warning: safeopen(%s) failed",
randfile);
}
}
else if (randdef == RF_OK)
{
if (LogLevel > logl)
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS: Error: no proper random file definition %s",
randfile);
randdef = RF_UNKNOWN;
}
if (randdef == RF_MISS)
{
if (LogLevel > logl)
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS: Error: missing random file definition");
}
if (!ok && bitnset(DBS_INSUFFICIENTENTROPY, DontBlameSendmail))
{
int i;
long r;
unsigned char buf[MIN_RAND_BYTES];
/* assert((MIN_RAND_BYTES % sizeof(long)) == 0); */
for (i = 0; i <= sizeof(buf) - sizeof(long); i += sizeof(long))
{
r = get_random();
(void) memcpy(buf + i, (void *) &r, sizeof(long));
}
RAND_seed(buf, sizeof(buf));
if (LogLevel > logl)
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS: Warning: random number generator not properly seeded");
ok = true;
}
done = ok ? RI_SUCCESS : RI_FAIL;
return ok;
# else /* ! HASURANDOMDEV */
return true;
# endif /* ! HASURANDOMDEV */
}
/*
** INIT_TLS_LIBRARY -- Calls functions which setup TLS library for global use.
**
** Parameters:
** none.
**
** Returns:
** succeeded?
*/
bool
init_tls_library()
{
/* basic TLS initialization, ignore result for now */
SSL_library_init();
SSL_load_error_strings();
# if 0
/* this is currently a macro for SSL_library_init */
SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms();
# endif /* 0 */
return tls_rand_init(RandFile, 7);
}
/*
** TLS_SET_VERIFY -- request client certificate?
**
** Parameters:
** ctx -- TLS context
** ssl -- TLS structure
** vrfy -- require certificate?
**
** Returns:
** none.
**
** Side Effects:
** Sets verification state for TLS
**
# if TLS_VRFY_PER_CTX
** Notice:
** This is per TLS context, not per TLS structure;
** the former is global, the latter per connection.
** It would be nice to do this per connection, but this
** doesn't work in the current TLS libraries :-(
# endif * TLS_VRFY_PER_CTX *
*/
void
tls_set_verify(ctx, ssl, vrfy)
SSL_CTX *ctx;
SSL *ssl;
bool vrfy;
{
# if !TLS_VRFY_PER_CTX
SSL_set_verify(ssl, vrfy ? SSL_VERIFY_PEER : SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL);
# else /* !TLS_VRFY_PER_CTX */
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, vrfy ? SSL_VERIFY_PEER : SSL_VERIFY_NONE,
NULL);
# endif /* !TLS_VRFY_PER_CTX */
}
/*
** status in initialization
** these flags keep track of the status of the initialization
** i.e., whether a file exists (_EX) and whether it can be used (_OK)
** [due to permissions]
*/
# define TLS_S_NONE 0x00000000 /* none yet */
# define TLS_S_CERT_EX 0x00000001 /* cert file exists */
# define TLS_S_CERT_OK 0x00000002 /* cert file is ok */
# define TLS_S_KEY_EX 0x00000004 /* key file exists */
# define TLS_S_KEY_OK 0x00000008 /* key file is ok */
# define TLS_S_CERTP_EX 0x00000010 /* CA cert path exists */
# define TLS_S_CERTP_OK 0x00000020 /* CA cert path is ok */
# define TLS_S_CERTF_EX 0x00000040 /* CA cert file exists */
# define TLS_S_CERTF_OK 0x00000080 /* CA cert file is ok */
# define TLS_S_CRLF_EX 0x00000100 /* CRL file exists */
# define TLS_S_CRLF_OK 0x00000200 /* CRL file is ok */
# if _FFR_TLS_1
# define TLS_S_CERT2_EX 0x00001000 /* 2nd cert file exists */
# define TLS_S_CERT2_OK 0x00002000 /* 2nd cert file is ok */
# define TLS_S_KEY2_EX 0x00004000 /* 2nd key file exists */
# define TLS_S_KEY2_OK 0x00008000 /* 2nd key file is ok */
# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */
# define TLS_S_DH_OK 0x00200000 /* DH cert is ok */
# define TLS_S_DHPAR_EX 0x00400000 /* DH param file exists */
# define TLS_S_DHPAR_OK 0x00800000 /* DH param file is ok to use */
/* Type of variable */
# define TLS_T_OTHER 0
# define TLS_T_SRV 1
# define TLS_T_CLT 2
/*
** TLS_OK_F -- can var be an absolute filename?
**
** Parameters:
** var -- filename
** fn -- what is the filename used for?
** type -- type of variable
**
** Returns:
** ok?
*/
static bool
tls_ok_f(var, fn, type)
char *var;
char *fn;
int type;
{
/* must be absolute pathname */
if (var != NULL && *var == '/')
return true;
if (LogLevel > 12)
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS: %s%s missing",
type == TLS_T_SRV ? "Server" :
(type == TLS_T_CLT ? "Client" : ""), fn);
return false;
}
/*
** TLS_SAFE_F -- is a file safe to use?
**
** Parameters:
** var -- filename
** sff -- flags for safefile()
** srv -- server side?
**
** Returns:
** ok?
*/
static bool
tls_safe_f(var, sff, srv)
char *var;
long sff;
bool srv;
{
int ret;
if ((ret = safefile(var, RunAsUid, RunAsGid, RunAsUserName, sff,
S_IRUSR, NULL)) == 0)
return true;
if (LogLevel > 7)
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s: file %s unsafe: %s",
srv ? "server" : "client", var, sm_errstring(ret));
return false;
}
/*
** TLS_OK_F -- macro to simplify calls to tls_ok_f
**
** Parameters:
** var -- filename
** fn -- what is the filename used for?
** req -- is the file required?
** st -- status bit to set if ok
** type -- type of variable
**
** Side Effects:
** uses r, ok; may change ok and status.
**
*/
# define TLS_OK_F(var, fn, req, st, type) if (ok) \
{ \
r = tls_ok_f(var, fn, type); \
if (r) \
status |= st; \
else if (req) \
ok = false; \
}
/*
** TLS_UNR -- macro to return whether a file should be unreadable
**
** Parameters:
** bit -- flag to test
** req -- flags
**
** Returns:
** 0/SFF_NORFILES
*/
# define TLS_UNR(bit, req) (bitset(bit, req) ? SFF_NORFILES : 0)
# define TLS_OUNR(bit, req) (bitset(bit, req) ? SFF_NOWRFILES : 0)
# define TLS_KEYSFF(req) \
(bitnset(DBS_GROUPREADABLEKEYFILE, DontBlameSendmail) ? \
TLS_OUNR(TLS_I_KEY_OUNR, req) : \
TLS_UNR(TLS_I_KEY_UNR, req))
/*
** TLS_SAFE_F -- macro to simplify calls to tls_safe_f
**
** Parameters:
** var -- filename
** sff -- flags for safefile()
** req -- is the file required?
** ex -- does the file exist?
** st -- status bit to set if ok
** srv -- server side?
**
** Side Effects:
** uses r, ok, ex; may change ok and status.
**
*/
# define TLS_SAFE_F(var, sff, req, ex, st, srv) if (ex && ok) \
{ \
r = tls_safe_f(var, sff, srv); \
if (r) \
status |= st; \
else if (req) \
ok = false; \
}
/*
** INITTLS -- initialize TLS
**
** Parameters:
** ctx -- pointer to context
** req -- requirements for initialization (see sendmail.h)
** options -- options
** srv -- server side?
** certfile -- filename of certificate
** keyfile -- filename of private key
** cacertpath -- path to CAs
** cacertfile -- file with CA(s)
** dhparam -- parameters for DH
**
** Returns:
** succeeded?
*/
/*
** The session_id_context identifies the service that created a session.
** This information is used to distinguish between multiple TLS-based
** servers running on the same server. We use the name of the mail system.
** Note: the session cache is not persistent.
*/
static char server_session_id_context[] = "sendmail8";
/* 0.9.8a and b have a problem with SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG */
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL)
# define SM_SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG 1
#else
# define SM_SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG 0
#endif
bool
inittls(ctx, req, options, srv, certfile, keyfile, cacertpath, cacertfile, dhparam)
SSL_CTX **ctx;
unsigned long req;
long options;
bool srv;
char *certfile, *keyfile, *cacertpath, *cacertfile, *dhparam;
{
# if !NO_DH
static DH *dh = NULL;
# endif /* !NO_DH */
int r;
bool ok;
long sff, status;
char *who;
# if _FFR_TLS_1
char *cf2, *kf2;
# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */
# if SM_CONF_SHM
extern int ShmId;
# endif /* SM_CONF_SHM */
# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L
BIO *crl_file;
X509_CRL *crl;
X509_STORE *store;
# endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */
#if SM_SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
long rt_version;
STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *comp_methods;
#endif
status = TLS_S_NONE;
who = srv ? "server" : "client";
if (ctx == NULL)
{
syserr("STARTTLS=%s, inittls: ctx == NULL", who);
/* NOTREACHED */
SM_ASSERT(ctx != NULL);
}
/* already initialized? (we could re-init...) */
if (*ctx != NULL)
return true;
ok = true;
# if _FFR_TLS_1
/*
** look for a second filename: it must be separated by a ','
** no blanks allowed (they won't be skipped).
** we change a global variable here! this change will be undone
** before return from the function but only if it returns true.
** this isn't a problem since in a failure case this function
** won't be called again with the same (overwritten) values.
** otherwise each return must be replaced with a goto endinittls.
*/
cf2 = NULL;
kf2 = NULL;
if (certfile != NULL && (cf2 = strchr(certfile, ',')) != NULL)
{
*cf2++ = '\0';
if (keyfile != NULL && (kf2 = strchr(keyfile, ',')) != NULL)
*kf2++ = '\0';
}
# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */
/*
** Check whether files/paths are defined
*/
TLS_OK_F(certfile, "CertFile", bitset(TLS_I_CERT_EX, req),
TLS_S_CERT_EX, srv ? TLS_T_SRV : TLS_T_CLT);
TLS_OK_F(keyfile, "KeyFile", bitset(TLS_I_KEY_EX, req),
TLS_S_KEY_EX, srv ? TLS_T_SRV : TLS_T_CLT);
TLS_OK_F(cacertpath, "CACertPath", bitset(TLS_I_CERTP_EX, req),
TLS_S_CERTP_EX, TLS_T_OTHER);
TLS_OK_F(cacertfile, "CACertFile", bitset(TLS_I_CERTF_EX, req),
TLS_S_CERTF_EX, TLS_T_OTHER);
# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L
TLS_OK_F(CRLFile, "CRLFile", bitset(TLS_I_CRLF_EX, req),
TLS_S_CRLF_EX, TLS_T_OTHER);
# endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */
# if _FFR_TLS_1
/*
** if the second file is specified it must exist
** XXX: it is possible here to define only one of those files
*/
if (cf2 != NULL)
{
TLS_OK_F(cf2, "CertFile", bitset(TLS_I_CERT_EX, req),
TLS_S_CERT2_EX, srv ? TLS_T_SRV : TLS_T_CLT);
}
if (kf2 != NULL)
{
TLS_OK_F(kf2, "KeyFile", bitset(TLS_I_KEY_EX, req),
TLS_S_KEY2_EX, srv ? TLS_T_SRV : TLS_T_CLT);
}
# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */
/*
** valid values for dhparam are (only the first char is checked)
** none no parameters: don't use DH
** 512 generate 512 bit parameters (fixed)
** 1024 generate 1024 bit parameters
** /file/name read parameters from /file/name
** default is: 1024 for server, 512 for client (OK? XXX)
*/
if (bitset(TLS_I_TRY_DH, req))
{
if (dhparam != NULL)
{
char c = *dhparam;
if (c == '1')
req |= TLS_I_DH1024;
else if (c == '5')
req |= TLS_I_DH512;
else if (c != 'n' && c != 'N' && c != '/')
{
if (LogLevel > 12)
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s, error: illegal value '%s' for DHParam",
who, dhparam);
dhparam = NULL;
}
}
if (dhparam == NULL)
{
dhparam = srv ? "1" : "5";
req |= (srv ? TLS_I_DH1024 : TLS_I_DH512);
}
else if (*dhparam == '/')
{
TLS_OK_F(dhparam, "DHParameters",
bitset(TLS_I_DHPAR_EX, req),
TLS_S_DHPAR_EX, TLS_T_OTHER);
}
}
if (!ok)
return ok;
/* certfile etc. must be "safe". */
sff = SFF_REGONLY | SFF_SAFEDIRPATH | SFF_NOWLINK
| SFF_NOGWFILES | SFF_NOWWFILES
| SFF_MUSTOWN | SFF_ROOTOK | SFF_OPENASROOT;
if (DontLockReadFiles)
sff |= SFF_NOLOCK;
TLS_SAFE_F(certfile, sff | TLS_UNR(TLS_I_CERT_UNR, req),
bitset(TLS_I_CERT_EX, req),
bitset(TLS_S_CERT_EX, status), TLS_S_CERT_OK, srv);
TLS_SAFE_F(keyfile, sff | TLS_KEYSFF(req),
bitset(TLS_I_KEY_EX, req),
bitset(TLS_S_KEY_EX, status), TLS_S_KEY_OK, srv);
TLS_SAFE_F(cacertfile, sff | TLS_UNR(TLS_I_CERTF_UNR, req),
bitset(TLS_I_CERTF_EX, req),
bitset(TLS_S_CERTF_EX, status), TLS_S_CERTF_OK, srv);
TLS_SAFE_F(dhparam, sff | TLS_UNR(TLS_I_DHPAR_UNR, req),
bitset(TLS_I_DHPAR_EX, req),
bitset(TLS_S_DHPAR_EX, status), TLS_S_DHPAR_OK, srv);
# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L
TLS_SAFE_F(CRLFile, sff | TLS_UNR(TLS_I_CRLF_UNR, req),
bitset(TLS_I_CRLF_EX, req),
bitset(TLS_S_CRLF_EX, status), TLS_S_CRLF_OK, srv);
# endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */
if (!ok)
return ok;
# if _FFR_TLS_1
if (cf2 != NULL)
{
TLS_SAFE_F(cf2, sff | TLS_UNR(TLS_I_CERT_UNR, req),
bitset(TLS_I_CERT_EX, req),
bitset(TLS_S_CERT2_EX, status), TLS_S_CERT2_OK, srv);
}
if (kf2 != NULL)
{
TLS_SAFE_F(kf2, sff | TLS_KEYSFF(req),
bitset(TLS_I_KEY_EX, req),
bitset(TLS_S_KEY2_EX, status), TLS_S_KEY2_OK, srv);
}
# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */
/* create a method and a new context */
if ((*ctx = SSL_CTX_new(srv ? SSLv23_server_method() :
SSLv23_client_method())) == NULL)
{
if (LogLevel > 7)
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_%s_method()) failed",
who, who);
if (LogLevel > 9)
tlslogerr(who);
return false;
}
# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L
if (CRLFile != NULL)
{
/* get a pointer to the current certificate validation store */
store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(*ctx); /* does not fail */
crl_file = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
if (crl_file != NULL)
{
if (BIO_read_filename(crl_file, CRLFile) >= 0)
{
crl = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(crl_file, NULL,
NULL, NULL);
BIO_free(crl_file);
X509_STORE_add_crl(store, crl);
X509_CRL_free(crl);
X509_STORE_set_flags(store,
X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
X509_STORE_set_verify_cb_func(store,
x509_verify_cb);
}
else
{
if (LogLevel > 9)
{
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s, error: PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(%s)=failed",
who, CRLFile);
}
/* avoid memory leaks */
BIO_free(crl_file);
return false;
}
}
else if (LogLevel > 9)
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s, error: BIO_new=failed", who);
}
else
store = NULL;
# if _FFR_CRLPATH
if (CRLPath != NULL && store != NULL)
{
X509_LOOKUP *lookup;
lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir());
if (lookup == NULL)
{
if (LogLevel > 9)
{
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s, error: X509_STORE_add_lookup(hash)=failed",
who, CRLFile);
}
return false;
}
X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, CRLPath, X509_FILETYPE_PEM);
X509_STORE_set_flags(store,
X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
}
# endif /* _FFR_CRLPATH */
# endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */
# if TLS_NO_RSA
/* turn off backward compatibility, required for no-rsa */
SSL_CTX_set_options(*ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
# endif /* TLS_NO_RSA */
# if !TLS_NO_RSA
/*
** Create a temporary RSA key
** XXX Maybe we shouldn't create this always (even though it
** is only at startup).
** It is a time-consuming operation and it is not always necessary.
** maybe we should do it only on demand...
*/
if (bitset(TLS_I_RSA_TMP, req)
# if SM_CONF_SHM
&& ShmId != SM_SHM_NO_ID &&
(rsa_tmp = RSA_generate_key(RSA_KEYLENGTH, RSA_F4, NULL,
NULL)) == NULL
# else /* SM_CONF_SHM */
&& 0 /* no shared memory: no need to generate key now */
# endif /* SM_CONF_SHM */
)
{
if (LogLevel > 7)
{
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s, error: RSA_generate_key failed",
who);
if (LogLevel > 9)
tlslogerr(who);
}
return false;
}
# endif /* !TLS_NO_RSA */
/*
** load private key
** XXX change this for DSA-only version
*/
if (bitset(TLS_S_KEY_OK, status) &&
SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(*ctx, keyfile,
SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0)
{
if (LogLevel > 7)
{
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(%s) failed",
who, keyfile);
if (LogLevel > 9)
tlslogerr(who);
}
if (bitset(TLS_I_USE_KEY, req))
return false;
}
/* get the certificate file */
if (bitset(TLS_S_CERT_OK, status) &&
SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(*ctx, certfile,
SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0)
{
if (LogLevel > 7)
{
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(%s) failed",
who, certfile);
if (LogLevel > 9)
tlslogerr(who);
}
if (bitset(TLS_I_USE_CERT, req))
return false;
}
/* check the private key */
if (bitset(TLS_S_KEY_OK, status) &&
(r = SSL_CTX_check_private_key(*ctx)) <= 0)
{
/* Private key does not match the certificate public key */
if (LogLevel > 5)
{
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_check_private_key failed(%s): %d",
who, keyfile, r);
if (LogLevel > 9)
tlslogerr(who);
}
if (bitset(TLS_I_USE_KEY, req))
return false;
}
# if _FFR_TLS_1
/* XXX this code is pretty much duplicated from above! */
/* load private key */
if (bitset(TLS_S_KEY2_OK, status) &&
SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(*ctx, kf2, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0)
{
if (LogLevel > 7)
{
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(%s) failed",
who, kf2);
if (LogLevel > 9)
tlslogerr(who);
}
}
/* get the certificate file */
if (bitset(TLS_S_CERT2_OK, status) &&
SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(*ctx, cf2, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0)
{
if (LogLevel > 7)
{
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(%s) failed",
who, cf2);
if (LogLevel > 9)
tlslogerr(who);
}
}
/* also check the private key */
if (bitset(TLS_S_KEY2_OK, status) &&
(r = SSL_CTX_check_private_key(*ctx)) <= 0)
{
/* Private key does not match the certificate public key */
if (LogLevel > 5)
{
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_check_private_key 2 failed: %d",
who, r);
if (LogLevel > 9)
tlslogerr(who);
}
}
# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */
/* SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(*ctx, 1); violation of standard? */
#if SM_SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
/*
** In OpenSSL 0.9.8[ab], enabling zlib compression breaks the
** padding bug work-around, leading to false positives and
** failed connections. We may not interoperate with systems
** with the bug, but this is better than breaking on all 0.9.8[ab]
** systems that have zlib support enabled.
** Note: this checks the runtime version of the library, not
** just the compile time version.
*/
rt_version = SSLeay();
if (rt_version >= 0x00908000L && rt_version <= 0x0090802fL)
{
comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
if (comp_methods != NULL && sk_SSL_COMP_num(comp_methods) > 0)
options &= ~SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG;
}
#endif
SSL_CTX_set_options(*ctx, options);
# if !NO_DH
/* Diffie-Hellman initialization */
if (bitset(TLS_I_TRY_DH, req))
{
if (bitset(TLS_S_DHPAR_OK, status))
{
BIO *bio;
if ((bio = BIO_new_file(dhparam, "r")) != NULL)
{
dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
BIO_free(bio);
if (dh == NULL && LogLevel > 7)
{
unsigned long err;
err = ERR_get_error();
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s, error: cannot read DH parameters(%s): %s",
who, dhparam,
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
if (LogLevel > 9)
tlslogerr(who);
}
}
else
{
if (LogLevel > 5)
{
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s, error: BIO_new_file(%s) failed",
who, dhparam);
if (LogLevel > 9)
tlslogerr(who);
}
}
}
if (dh == NULL && bitset(TLS_I_DH1024, req))
{
DSA *dsa;
/* this takes a while! (7-130s on a 450MHz AMD K6-2) */
dsa = DSA_generate_parameters(1024, NULL, 0, NULL,
NULL, 0, NULL);
dh = DSA_dup_DH(dsa);
DSA_free(dsa);
}
else
if (dh == NULL && bitset(TLS_I_DH512, req))
dh = get_dh512();
if (dh == NULL)
{
if (LogLevel > 9)
{
unsigned long err;
err = ERR_get_error();
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s, error: cannot read or set DH parameters(%s): %s",
who, dhparam,
ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
}
if (bitset(TLS_I_REQ_DH, req))
return false;
}
else
{
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(*ctx, dh);
/* important to avoid small subgroup attacks */
SSL_CTX_set_options(*ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
if (LogLevel > 13)
sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s, Diffie-Hellman init, key=%d bit (%c)",
who, 8 * DH_size(dh), *dhparam);
DH_free(dh);
}
}
# endif /* !NO_DH */
/* XXX do we need this cache here? */
if (bitset(TLS_I_CACHE, req))
{
SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(*ctx, 1);
SSL_CTX_set_timeout(*ctx, 1);
SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(*ctx,
(void *) &server_session_id_context,
sizeof(server_session_id_context));
(void) SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(*ctx,
SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
}
else
{
(void) SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(*ctx,
SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
}
/* load certificate locations and default CA paths */
if (bitset(TLS_S_CERTP_EX, status) && bitset(TLS_S_CERTF_EX, status))
{
if ((r = SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(*ctx, cacertfile,
cacertpath)) == 1)
{
# if !TLS_NO_RSA
if (bitset(TLS_I_RSA_TMP, req))
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(*ctx, tmp_rsa_key);
# endif /* !TLS_NO_RSA */
/*
** We have to install our own verify callback:
** SSL_VERIFY_PEER requests a client cert but even
** though *FAIL_IF* isn't set, the connection
** will be aborted if the client presents a cert
** that is not "liked" (can't be verified?) by
** the TLS library :-(
*/
/*
** XXX currently we could call tls_set_verify()
** but we hope that that function will later on
** only set the mode per connection.
*/
SSL_CTX_set_verify(*ctx,
bitset(TLS_I_NO_VRFY, req) ? SSL_VERIFY_NONE
: SSL_VERIFY_PEER,
NULL);
/* install verify callback */
SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(*ctx, tls_verify_cb,
NULL);
SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(*ctx,
SSL_load_client_CA_file(cacertfile));
}
else
{
/*
** can't load CA data; do we care?
** the data is necessary to authenticate the client,
** which in turn would be necessary
** if we want to allow relaying based on it.
*/
if (LogLevel > 5)
{
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s, error: load verify locs %s, %s failed: %d",
who, cacertpath, cacertfile, r);
if (LogLevel > 9)
tlslogerr(who);
}
if (bitset(TLS_I_VRFY_LOC, req))
return false;
}
}
/* XXX: make this dependent on an option? */
if (tTd(96, 9))
SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(*ctx, apps_ssl_info_cb);
# if _FFR_TLS_1
/* install our own cipher list */
if (CipherList != NULL && *CipherList != '\0')
{
if (SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(*ctx, CipherList) <= 0)
{
if (LogLevel > 7)
{
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s, error: SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(%s) failed, list ignored",
who, CipherList);
if (LogLevel > 9)
tlslogerr(who);
}
/* failure if setting to this list is required? */
}
}
# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */
if (LogLevel > 12)
sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID, "STARTTLS=%s, init=%d", who, ok);
# if _FFR_TLS_1
# if 0
/*
** this label is required if we want to have a "clean" exit
** see the comments above at the initialization of cf2
*/
endinittls:
# endif /* 0 */
/* undo damage to global variables */
if (cf2 != NULL)
*--cf2 = ',';
if (kf2 != NULL)
*--kf2 = ',';
# endif /* _FFR_TLS_1 */
return ok;
}
/*
** TLS_GET_INFO -- get information about TLS connection
**
** Parameters:
** ssl -- TLS connection structure
** srv -- server or client
** host -- hostname of other side
** mac -- macro storage
** certreq -- did we ask for a cert?
**
** Returns:
** result of authentication.
**
** Side Effects:
** sets macros: {cipher}, {tls_version}, {verify},
** {cipher_bits}, {alg_bits}, {cert}, {cert_subject},
** {cert_issuer}, {cn_subject}, {cn_issuer}
*/
int
tls_get_info(ssl, srv, host, mac, certreq)
SSL *ssl;
bool srv;
char *host;
MACROS_T *mac;
bool certreq;
{
SSL_CIPHER *c;
int b, r;
long verifyok;
char *s, *who;
char bitstr[16];
X509 *cert;
c = SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl);
/* cast is just workaround for compiler warning */
macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cipher}"),
(char *) SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
b = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(c, &r);
(void) sm_snprintf(bitstr, sizeof(bitstr), "%d", b);
macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cipher_bits}"), bitstr);
(void) sm_snprintf(bitstr, sizeof(bitstr), "%d", r);
macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{alg_bits}"), bitstr);
s = SSL_CIPHER_get_version(c);
if (s == NULL)
s = "UNKNOWN";
macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{tls_version}"), s);
who = srv ? "server" : "client";
cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
verifyok = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);
if (LogLevel > 14)
sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s, get_verify: %ld get_peer: 0x%lx",
who, verifyok, (unsigned long) cert);
if (cert != NULL)
{
unsigned int n;
X509_NAME *subj, *issuer;
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
char buf[MAXNAME];
subj = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(cert);
X509_NAME_oneline(subj, buf, sizeof(buf));
macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cert_subject}"),
xtextify(buf, "<>\")"));
X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, buf, sizeof(buf));
macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cert_issuer}"),
xtextify(buf, "<>\")"));
#define CHECK_X509_NAME(which) \
do { \
if (r == -1) \
{ \
sm_strlcpy(buf, "BadCertificateUnknown", sizeof(buf)); \
if (LogLevel > 7) \
sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID, \
"STARTTLS=%s, relay=%.100s, field=%s, status=failed to extract CN", \
who, \
host == NULL ? "local" : host, \
which); \
} \
else if ((size_t)r >= sizeof(buf) - 1) \
{ \
sm_strlcpy(buf, "BadCertificateTooLong", sizeof(buf)); \
if (LogLevel > 7) \
sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID, \
"STARTTLS=%s, relay=%.100s, field=%s, status=CN too long", \
who, \
host == NULL ? "local" : host, \
which); \
} \
else if ((size_t)r > strlen(buf)) \
{ \
sm_strlcpy(buf, "BadCertificateContainsNUL", \
sizeof(buf)); \
if (LogLevel > 7) \
sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID, \
"STARTTLS=%s, relay=%.100s, field=%s, status=CN contains NUL", \
who, \
host == NULL ? "local" : host, \
which); \
} \
} while (0)
r = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf,
sizeof buf);
CHECK_X509_NAME("cn_subject");
macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cn_subject}"),
xtextify(buf, "<>\")"));
r = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_commonName, buf,
sizeof buf);
CHECK_X509_NAME("cn_issuer");
macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cn_issuer}"),
xtextify(buf, "<>\")"));
n = 0;
if (X509_digest(cert, EVP_md5(), md, &n) != 0 && n > 0)
{
char md5h[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 3];
static const char hexcodes[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
SM_ASSERT((n * 3) + 2 < sizeof(md5h));
for (r = 0; r < (int) n; r++)
{
md5h[r * 3] = hexcodes[(md[r] & 0xf0) >> 4];
md5h[(r * 3) + 1] = hexcodes[(md[r] & 0x0f)];
md5h[(r * 3) + 2] = ':';
}
md5h[(n * 3) - 1] = '\0';
macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cert_md5}"), md5h);
}
else
macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cert_md5}"), "");
}
else
{
macdefine(mac, A_PERM, macid("{cert_subject}"), "");
macdefine(mac, A_PERM, macid("{cert_issuer}"), "");
macdefine(mac, A_PERM, macid("{cn_subject}"), "");
macdefine(mac, A_PERM, macid("{cn_issuer}"), "");
macdefine(mac, A_TEMP, macid("{cert_md5}"), "");
}
switch (verifyok)
{
case X509_V_OK:
if (cert != NULL)
{
s = "OK";
r = TLS_AUTH_OK;
}
else
{
s = certreq ? "NO" : "NOT",
r = TLS_AUTH_NO;
}
break;
default:
s = "FAIL";
r = TLS_AUTH_FAIL;
break;
}
macdefine(mac, A_PERM, macid("{verify}"), s);
if (cert != NULL)
X509_free(cert);
/* do some logging */
if (LogLevel > 8)
{
char *vers, *s1, *s2, *cbits, *algbits;
vers = macget(mac, macid("{tls_version}"));
cbits = macget(mac, macid("{cipher_bits}"));
algbits = macget(mac, macid("{alg_bits}"));
s1 = macget(mac, macid("{verify}"));
s2 = macget(mac, macid("{cipher}"));
/* XXX: maybe cut off ident info? */
sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s, relay=%.100s, version=%.16s, verify=%.16s, cipher=%.64s, bits=%.6s/%.6s",
who,
host == NULL ? "local" : host,
vers, s1, s2, /* sm_snprintf() can deal with NULL */
algbits == NULL ? "0" : algbits,
cbits == NULL ? "0" : cbits);
if (LogLevel > 11)
{
/*
** Maybe run xuntextify on the strings?
** That is easier to read but makes it maybe a bit
** more complicated to figure out the right values
** for the access map...
*/
s1 = macget(mac, macid("{cert_subject}"));
s2 = macget(mac, macid("{cert_issuer}"));
sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s, cert-subject=%.256s, cert-issuer=%.256s, verifymsg=%s",
who, s1, s2,
X509_verify_cert_error_string(verifyok));
}
}
return r;
}
/*
** ENDTLS -- shutdown secure connection
**
** Parameters:
** ssl -- SSL connection information.
** side -- server/client (for logging).
**
** Returns:
** success? (EX_* code)
*/
int
endtls(ssl, side)
SSL *ssl;
char *side;
{
int ret = EX_OK;
if (ssl != NULL)
{
int r;
if ((r = SSL_shutdown(ssl)) < 0)
{
if (LogLevel > 11)
{
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s, SSL_shutdown failed: %d",
side, r);
tlslogerr(side);
}
ret = EX_SOFTWARE;
}
# if !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x0090602fL
/*
** Bug in OpenSSL (at least up to 0.9.6b):
** From: Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE
** Message-ID: <20010723152244.A13122@serv01.aet.tu-cottbus.de>
** To: openssl-users@openssl.org
** Subject: Re: SSL_shutdown() woes (fwd)
**
** The side sending the shutdown alert first will
** not care about the answer of the peer but will
** immediately return with a return value of "0"
** (ssl/s3_lib.c:ssl3_shutdown()). SSL_get_error will evaluate
** the value of "0" and as the shutdown alert of the peer was
** not received (actually, the program did not even wait for
** the answer), an SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL is flagged, because this
** is the default rule in case everything else does not apply.
**
** For your server the problem is different, because it
** receives the shutdown first (setting SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN),
** then sends its response (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN), so for the
** server the shutdown was successfull.
**
** As is by know, you would have to call SSL_shutdown() once
** and ignore an SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL returned. Then call
** SSL_shutdown() again to actually get the server's response.
**
** In the last discussion, Bodo Moeller concluded that a
** rewrite of the shutdown code would be necessary, but
** probably with another API, as the change would not be
** compatible to the way it is now. Things do not become
** easier as other programs do not follow the shutdown
** guidelines anyway, so that a lot error conditions and
** compitibility issues would have to be caught.
**
** For now the recommondation is to ignore the error message.
*/
else if (r == 0)
{
if (LogLevel > 15)
{
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s, SSL_shutdown not done",
side);
tlslogerr(side);
}
ret = EX_SOFTWARE;
}
# endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x0090602fL */
SSL_free(ssl);
ssl = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
# if !TLS_NO_RSA
/*
** TMP_RSA_KEY -- return temporary RSA key
**
** Parameters:
** s -- TLS connection structure
** export --
** keylength --
**
** Returns:
** temporary RSA key.
*/
# ifndef MAX_RSA_TMP_CNT
# define MAX_RSA_TMP_CNT 1000 /* XXX better value? */
# endif /* ! MAX_RSA_TMP_CNT */
/* ARGUSED0 */
static RSA *
tmp_rsa_key(s, export, keylength)
SSL *s;
int export;
int keylength;
{
# if SM_CONF_SHM
extern int ShmId;
extern int *PRSATmpCnt;
if (ShmId != SM_SHM_NO_ID && rsa_tmp != NULL &&
++(*PRSATmpCnt) < MAX_RSA_TMP_CNT)
return rsa_tmp;
# endif /* SM_CONF_SHM */
if (rsa_tmp != NULL)
RSA_free(rsa_tmp);
rsa_tmp = RSA_generate_key(RSA_KEYLENGTH, RSA_F4, NULL, NULL);
if (rsa_tmp == NULL)
{
if (LogLevel > 0)
sm_syslog(LOG_ERR, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=server, tmp_rsa_key: RSA_generate_key failed!");
}
else
{
# if SM_CONF_SHM
# if 0
/*
** XXX we can't (yet) share the new key...
** The RSA structure contains pointers hence it can't be
** easily kept in shared memory. It must be transformed
** into a continous memory region first, then stored,
** and later read out again (each time re-transformed).
*/
if (ShmId != SM_SHM_NO_ID)
*PRSATmpCnt = 0;
# endif /* 0 */
# endif /* SM_CONF_SHM */
if (LogLevel > 9)
sm_syslog(LOG_ERR, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=server, tmp_rsa_key: new temp RSA key");
}
return rsa_tmp;
}
# endif /* !TLS_NO_RSA */
/*
** APPS_SSL_INFO_CB -- info callback for TLS connections
**
** Parameters:
** s -- TLS connection structure
** where -- state in handshake
** ret -- return code of last operation
**
** Returns:
** none.
*/
static void
apps_ssl_info_cb(s, where, ret)
CONST097 SSL *s;
int where;
int ret;
{
int w;
char *str;
BIO *bio_err = NULL;
if (LogLevel > 14)
sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID,
"STARTTLS: info_callback where=0x%x, ret=%d",
where, ret);
w = where & ~SSL_ST_MASK;
if (bio_err == NULL)
bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
if (bitset(SSL_ST_CONNECT, w))
str = "SSL_connect";
else if (bitset(SSL_ST_ACCEPT, w))
str = "SSL_accept";
else
str = "undefined";
if (bitset(SSL_CB_LOOP, where))
{
if (LogLevel > 12)
sm_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, NOQID,
"STARTTLS: %s:%s",
str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
}
else if (bitset(SSL_CB_ALERT, where))
{
str = bitset(SSL_CB_READ, where) ? "read" : "write";
if (LogLevel > 12)
sm_syslog(LOG_NOTICE, NOQID,
"STARTTLS: SSL3 alert %s:%s:%s",
str, SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret),
SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret));
}
else if (bitset(SSL_CB_EXIT, where))
{
if (ret == 0)
{
if (LogLevel > 7)
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS: %s:failed in %s",
str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
}
else if (ret < 0)
{
if (LogLevel > 7)
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS: %s:error in %s",
str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
}
}
}
/*
** TLS_VERIFY_LOG -- log verify error for TLS certificates
**
** Parameters:
** ok -- verify ok?
** ctx -- x509 context
**
** Returns:
** 0 -- fatal error
** 1 -- ok
*/
static int
tls_verify_log(ok, ctx, name)
int ok;
X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
char *name;
{
SSL *ssl;
X509 *cert;
int reason, depth;
char buf[512];
cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
reason = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
ssl = (SSL *) X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,
SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
if (ssl == NULL)
{
/* internal error */
sm_syslog(LOG_ERR, NOQID,
"STARTTLS: internal error: tls_verify_cb: ssl == NULL");
return 0;
}
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
sm_syslog(LOG_INFO, NOQID,
"STARTTLS: %s cert verify: depth=%d %s, state=%d, reason=%s",
name, depth, buf, ok, X509_verify_cert_error_string(reason));
return 1;
}
/*
** TLS_VERIFY_CB -- verify callback for TLS certificates
**
** Parameters:
** ctx -- x509 context
**
** Returns:
** accept connection?
** currently: always yes.
*/
static int
# if !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
tls_verify_cb(ctx)
X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
# else /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */
tls_verify_cb(ctx, unused)
X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
void *unused;
# endif /* !defined() || OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L */
{
int ok;
/*
** man SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback():
** callback should return 1 to indicate verification success
** and 0 to indicate verification failure.
*/
ok = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
if (ok <= 0)
{
if (LogLevel > 13)
return tls_verify_log(ok, ctx, "TLS");
}
return 1;
}
/*
** TLSLOGERR -- log the errors from the TLS error stack
**
** Parameters:
** who -- server/client (for logging).
**
** Returns:
** none.
*/
void
tlslogerr(who)
const char *who;
{
unsigned long l;
int line, flags;
unsigned long es;
char *file, *data;
char buf[256];
# define CP (const char **)
es = CRYPTO_thread_id();
while ((l = ERR_get_error_line_data(CP &file, &line, CP &data, &flags))
!= 0)
{
sm_syslog(LOG_WARNING, NOQID,
"STARTTLS=%s: %lu:%s:%s:%d:%s", who, es,
ERR_error_string(l, buf),
file, line,
bitset(ERR_TXT_STRING, flags) ? data : "");
}
}
# if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L
/*
** X509_VERIFY_CB -- verify callback
**
** Parameters:
** ctx -- x509 context
**
** Returns:
** accept connection?
** currently: always yes.
*/
static int
x509_verify_cb(ok, ctx)
int ok;
X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
{
if (ok == 0)
{
if (LogLevel > 13)
tls_verify_log(ok, ctx, "x509");
if (ctx->error == X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL)
{
ctx->error = 0;
return 1; /* override it */
}
}
return ok;
}
# endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x00907000L */
#endif /* STARTTLS */