[TUHS] YP / NIS / NIS+ / LDAP

Mantas Mikulėnas grawity at gmail.com
Tue Nov 6 23:46:34 AEST 2018


On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:21 PM Ben Greenfield <ben at cogs.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Nov 6, 2018, at 1:53 AM, Mantas Mikulėnas <grawity at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Nov 6, 2018, 01:32 Ben Greenfield via TUHS <tuhs at minnie.tuhs.org>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> > On Nov 5, 2018, at 2:36 PM, Grant Taylor via TUHS <tuhs at minnie.tuhs.org>
>> wrote:
>> >
>> > On 11/05/2018 12:24 AM, Mantas Mikulėnas wrote:
>> >> Let the client handle authentication via Kerberos
>> >
>> > I don't know enough about Kerberos (yet) to know if it would be
>> possible for a login process to communicate with the KDC and get a TGT as
>> part of logging in, without already being logged in.
>> >
>> > My ignorance is leaving me with a priming problem that seems like a
>> catch 22.  You can't login without shadow information or TGT.  But
>> traditional (simpler) kinit is run after being logged in.  So ... how do
>> you detangle that?  The only thing that I can come up with is that the
>> login process does the kinit functionality on the users behalf.
>>
>> I found that I had to do all of this using SASL.
>>
>>
>> I remember it as SASL would handle the kerberization during boot up
>> getting tickets for each LDAP entry that you wanted mapped to a service on
>> that client.
>>
>
> Sorry but I cannot parse that sentence at all…
>
>
>
> I’m sorry it was about 8 years ago and is from memory but. I believe
> during the startup of the system the SASL config files contained tickets
> that established a trust relationship between that system and our Open
> Directory server. My memory is that each ticket was associated a service
> and the config file for the service  would point to the ticket.
>

Upon rereading this, you're probably thinking of keytabs (which hold static
pre-provisioned keys) rather than tickets (which hold session keys).

-- 
Mantas Mikulėnas
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