I'm amused (in a good way) that this thread persists, and without becoming boring. Speaking as someone who was Ken's sysadmin for six years, I find it hard to get upset over someone cracking a password hash that has been out in the open for decades, using an algorithm that became pragmatically unsafe slightly fewer decades ago. It really shouldn't be in use anywhere any more anyway. Were I still Ken's sysadmin I'd have leaned on him to change it long ago. So far as I know, my password from that era didn't escape the Labs, but nevertheless I abandoned it long ago--when I left the Labs myself, in fact. I do have one password that has been unchanged since the mid-1990s and is stored in heritage hash on a few computers that don't even have /etc/shadow, but those are not public systems. And it's probably time I changed it anyway. None of this is to excuse the creeps who steal passwords these days, nor to promote complacency. At the place I now work we had a possible /etc/shadow exposure some years back, and we reacted by pushing everyone to change their passwords and also by taking various measures to keep even the hashes better-hidden. But there is, or should be, a difference between a password that is still in use and one that was exposed so long ago, and in what is now so trivial an algorithm, that it is no more than a puzzle for fans of the old-fart days. Norman Wilson Toronto ON